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Abstract 
This paper analyses the profitability of palm oil certification through the use of a financial Cost-Benefit Analysis 
(CBA) and the assessment of Net Present Value (NPV). Better understanding the investment value of 
certification adoption can be used by policy makers or certification providers to bring in more smallholders and 
to make certification more beneficial for the generally vulnerable smallholders. The results indicate that 
certification is currently profitable for different types of Indonesian palm oil smallholders. The extent to which 
certification is profitable depends on the smallholder’s pre-conditions. In the self-funded scenario, certification is 
not profitable for scheme smallholders and only remains profitable for independent smallholders when they 
continue to receive premium prices. If premium prices are however removed the independent smallholders may 
need unrealistically high premium fees for certification to remain profitable in this scenario. Next to certification, 
we found that the organization of farmers around miller companies contributes positively to profit, even before 
certification takes place. Therefore investing in organization may be an effective form of government 
involvement.       
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1. Introduction 
If we consider monetary returns in relation to investments, oil palm is one of the most attractive commodities for 
smallholders, also compared to crops like cassava, rice, and rubber (Brandi et al., 2015; Subervie & Vagneron, 
2013). Although the expansion rate of oil palm plantations in Indonesia is slowly decreasing from 11% in 2009 
to 7% in 2013 (Statistik_Indonesia, 2014), the total land area of oil palm plantations owned by smallholders in 
Indonesia still increases every year. Oil palm plantations contribute positively to the economic situation of 
smallholders by reducing unemployment and poverty, particularly in rural areas (Allen Blackman & Guerrero, 
2012; McCarthy, Gillespie, & Zen, 2012; WorldGrowth, 2011; WWF, 2013). Notwithstanding these positive 
effects, the expansion of palm oil plantations is not undebated as many studies also discovered negative effects 
of oil palm plantations on the environment and social position of smallholders (McCarthy et al., 2012). More 
specifically, palm oil expansion is said to contribute to deforestation, greenhouse gas emissions, and land 
conflicts (Fitzherbert et al., 2008; Obidzinski, Andriani, Komarudin, & Andrianto, 2012). 
Increasing awareness of international buyers about sustainability problems related to the production of 
agricultural commodities has led to the emergence of private sustainability certification standards (Basu, Chau, 
& Grote, 2004; Jena, Chichaibelu, Stellmacher, & Grote, 2012), such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
(RSPO). These standards can be seen as new governance models (Glasbergen, 2013) and alternative steering 
instruments for governmental regulation to overcome the downside effects of agricultural production 
(Oosterveer, Adjei, Vellema, & Slingerland, 2014).   
The RSPO, as one of the most important organisations for sustainability certification (Offermans & 
Glasbergen, 2015), was established in 2004 (Preusser, 2015) and initially targeted large-scale producers 
(Schouten & Glasbergen, 2011; Silva-Castañeda, 2012). However, 42% of the Indonesian palm oil producers are 
smallholders who together own 4.42 million ha of oil palm plantations (Statistik_Indonesia, 2014). Although 
palm oil certification has a potentially positive effect on smallholder’s livelihoods, certification does not improve 
smallholders’ vulnerable position or market access (Hidayat, Glasbergen, & Offermans, 2015). There are two 
types of oil palm smallholders in Indonesia (Brandi et al., 2013): the scheme smallholders, who are tied to a 
palm oil company through formal partnerships that also provide the farmers with technical assistance, and the 
independent smallholders, who operate independently and without assistance from palm oil companies. 
Although both groups are differently institutionalized, they face comparable challenges to enroll in certification 
(Brandi et al., 2013), which puts them in a marginalized position from the sustainable palm oil market (Asfaw, 
Mithöfer, & Waibel, 2010; Pichler, 2013). These challenges include the lack of capacity and knowledge 
regarding compliance to the standards, the lack of organization and incentives to become involved, and high 
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certification cost (Brandi et al., 2015). Therefore, even though the establishment of the RSPO took place more 
than a decade ago already, only 3.8% of the total Indonesian smallholders are certified (Estimated value).  
Acknowledging the importance of smallholders in the oil palm production, the RSPO developed many 
sub-programs intended to bring in more smallholders in the certification. Examples are the Smallholder Task 
Force (STF) and the RSPO Smallholders Support Fund (RSSF) (Pesqueira & Glasbergen, 2013). Furthermore, 
the Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) sustainability standard that was developed by the Indonesian 
Government, is now mandatory for large-scale companies,  and  will become mandatory for smallholders in 
2022 (for more information see Hospes, 2014; Hospes & Kentin, 2012; Schouten & Bitzer, 2015). 
Earlier research shows that financial benefits are the main motivation of smallholders to participate in 
sustainability certification (Hidayat et al., 2015). So far, it however remains unclear whether the new practices 
that go together with palm oil certification, present better profit. We argue that, for smallholders, certification 
adoption may be seen as an investment project that should offer tangible financial benefits in order to consider 
participation in it. Next, it is not only the present profitability of palm oil certification that remains unclear, but 
also the potential future profitability. The latter is particularly uncertain because certified smallholders are 
currently dependent on companies or NGOs to pay the certification costs (Bitzer, Glasbergen, & Arts, 2013; 
Hidayat et al., 2015), and to provide the farmers with a premium fee. Both forms of support can however not be 
guaranteed into the future, and changes may result in consequences for smallholder’s profit, making certification 
adoption less attractive. 
To this end, this study analyses whether or not certification is profitable for Indonesian palm oil 
smallholders. We defined two research questions: (1) to what extent and in what way is sustainability 
certification profitable for Indonesian palm oil smallholders? (2) Following from the fact that certification costs 
are currently paid by the affiliated miller companies or donors we question: Is certification still profitable for 
Indonesian palm oil smallholders if they had to pay all certification costs themselves? If not, how much premium 
fee would then be necessary to make certification profitable for the smallholders?  
A way to analyse the profitability of palm oil certification is to use cost-benefit analysis. This analysis 
assesses the profitability of an investment project or program (Campbell & Brown, 2003) as an aid for decision 
making (Zerbe & Dively, 1994). It provides information on whether or not a particular project is worthwhile 
(Campbell & Brown, 2003; Prest & Turvey, 1965) given present resources and expected future outputs and by 
comparing costs and benefits in the case of project adoption and in the case wherein the project will not be 
adopted, or will be adopted in a different way. This approach helps to better understand the investment value of 
certification adoption. This information, on its turn, can be used by policy makers or certification providers to 
bring in more smallholders and to make certification more beneficial for the generally vulnerable smallholders.          
First we present information from previous studies on profitability of certification adoption (section 2), 
that results in our conceptual framework to assess profitability of the sustainability certification, which is 
presented in section 3. Sections four and five introduce the research methods, study sites and characteristics of 
the smallholder respondents. Our findings are presented in section six to eight, before turning to the conclusion 
in section nine. 
 
2. Literature Review 
There are several studies on the economic effects of certification. Most of them however focus on the effects of 
certification on gross income. For example, Méndez et al. (2010) who indicate positive effects of certification on 
gross income, or Ruben and Zuniga (2011) and Ruben and Fort (2012) who use a so-called Propensity Matching 
Score to compare differences in gross income between certified and uncertified farmers. Other impact studies 
compare differences between certified and uncertified farmers by looking at the revenues (e.g. incomes) minus 
the costs of production. Some authors refer to this as profit (Blackmore & Keeley, 2012; Valkila, 2009), others 
as net income (Christopher M. Bacon, Ernesto Méndez, Gómez, Stuart, & Flores, 2008; Jena et al., 2012), or 
gross margin (Bachmann, 2012; Beuchelt & Zeller, 2011). Although these studies use the same concept, they 
show conflicting results. Bachmann (2012), C. M. Bacon (2010), A. Blackman and Rivera (2011), and 
Blackmore and Keeley (2012) for example, conclude that certification contributes to higher profits for farmers. 
Christopher M. Bacon et al. (2008), Beuchelt and Zeller (2011), Valkila (2009), however, argued that the 
economic effect of certification is not clear and dependent on the type of certification, the price of uncertified 
commodities and the existence and size of a price premium. Jena et al. (2012) in their study about the 
profitability of coffee certification even reveal a negative contribution of certification to net income. The above 
presented studies share one important limitation as they only focus on production costs and therewith neglect the 
costs of certification in their calculations. Therefore these studies can be expected to present an incomplete 
understanding of the effects of certification on profitability.  
Studying the profitability of sustainability certification while including the costs of certification is not 
entirely new, but results from existing studies often conflict. Some studies pointed out that certification adoption 
is profitable for farmers (Nuva, Yusif, Hidayat, & Hanna, 2013; WWF, 2012), while other studies revealed that 
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certification adoption is not profitable (Beall, 2012; Simula, Antana, Ishmael, Santana, & Schidt, 2004; 
Wangrakdiskul & Yodpijit, 2013) or only reaches a break-even position (Victor, Gockowski, Agyeman, & 
Dziwornu, 2010). To calculate the size of benefits and costs, some studies (Nuva et al., 2013; Simula et al., 
2004; Wangrakdiskul & Yodpijit, 2013) use Net Present Values (NPV), which refer to the discounted value of 
the returns minus the discounted value of the costs of investment projects (Campbell & Brown, 2003). Others 
(Beall, 2012; WWF, 2012), use numbers for input, yield and price to calculate benefits, and some (Beall, 2012; 
Victor et al., 2010) conduct scenario studies.  
Nuva et al. (2013) conducted a cost-benefit analysis to assess the profitability of Eco-labelling for 
Indonesian coffee smallholders, concluding that certified plantations generated a higher NPV than non-certified 
plantations. Victor et al. (2010) explored the future profitability of Rainforest Alliance certified Cocoa in Ghana. 
They developed several scenarios for the use of inputs, farm gate prices and yields, and different parameters for 
technology advancements and the use of shade trees. Their results show that Rainforest Alliance certification 
may only reach a break-even point. Simula et al. (2004) also investigated the profitability of forest certification 
for Brazilian, Indonesian and Malaysian companies, showing different profitability results depending on the 
location and the initial performance of the adopters. The implementation of forest certification is profitable for 
companies in Malaysia and Indonesia, while it is not financially feasible in Brazil due to the high investment 
costs.  
Regarding profitability of palm oil certification, WWF (2012) investigated the financial costs and 
benefits of RSPO compliance in Indonesia and Malaysia. They studied ranges for costs and benefits and did not 
use an aggregate measurement (such as NPV, IRR and ROI) and solely looked at certification costs and benefits 
without comparing these with costs and benefits of non-certified farmers. They conclude that the annual 
certification costs range from $1.19 to $34.66 per smallholder per hectare and that the annual benefit equals 9.4 
to 26.9 MT yield improvement (WWF, 2012). They indicate that certification adoption is profitable as the 
benefits generally outweigh the costs of implementation. 
Beall (2012) also used the concept of profitability to measure monetary effects of palm oil certification 
on smallholders in Thailand. Beall (2012) simply subtracted the average costs of certification from the average 
income (per hectare/year) in one specific year. However, she neglected investment costs and possible long-term 
benefits, such as the effects of yield improvement. She did however consider different scenarios for premium 
fee, yields and fertilizer costs in her analysis. The study points out that certification is only financially viable if 
smallholders receive a premium fee higher than US$ 13.34/ton crude palm oil (CPO), if certification increase 
yields, and if fertilizer costs decrease.  
Where Beall (2012) analysed the profitability of certification in one random year, Wangrakdiskul and 
Yodpijit (2013) performed a cost-benefit analysis of RSPO certification for Thai smallholders based on 5 years. 
Wangrakdiskul and Yodpijit (2013) conclude that the prevailing premium fee of $15/ ton CPO is not enough to 
make RSPO certification a profitable project for farmers. The standard may however become profitable if 
training costs and certification costs decrease by 30% and if the premium price increases by 20%.    
These limited numbers of studies about the profitability of oil palm certification have some limitations. 
First, none of these studies assess the profitability of non-certified palm oil smallholders. This is however 
crucially important as smallholders will only consider certification adoption if it results in higher net profits 
compared to their profit as non-certified smallholder. Second, only parts of the certification costs are included in 
their analyses. Previous studies, for example, do not include investment costs, such as the cost for capacity 
development, membership fees, the establishment of waste management systems, and safety tools into their 
calculations. Therefore, it is not unlikely that the results of these studies give a too positive impression of the 
profitability of certification. Third, previous studies only assess the profitability of palm oil certification for one 
year net return (Beall, 2012),  or for one certification project life cycle (5 years, see Wangrakdiskul & Yodpijit, 
2013). Average oil palm plantations however, have a long lifespan of about 25 years (Pahan, 2008). Zooming in 
on a specific period of the plantation neglects variations in productivity resulting from the age of the oil palms. 
This may lead to misleading conclusions, e.g. too low if the plantation under analysis is very young or too high if 
the plantation is in its most productive stage. Considering these limitations, we identify the need for a cost-
benefit analysis to assess the profitability of palm oil certification for smallholders’ by comparing certified and 
non-certified farmers, considering the investment costs and the entire oil palm plantation lifecycle. 
 
3. Conceptual Framework 
Profitability is commonly defined as the ability of an investment project to earn a return from its use (Howard & 
Upton, 1953) and generally implies that benefits are, or income is, higher than the costs. Following earlier 
research revealing financial benefits as the most important motivation for smallholders to participate in 
certification (Hidayat et al., 2015; Ibnu, Glasbergen, Offermans, & Arifin, 2015; Ibnu, Offermans, Glasbergen, 
& Hismono, forthcoming), we have an additional requirement to speak of profitability as certified smallholders 
need to earn more profit than non-certified smallholders. To decompose all costs and benefits of palm oil 
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certification we developed a conceptual framework (see Figure 1), which adopts four starting points: 
First, the profitability of certified and non-certified oil palm plantations depends on: (1) investment 
costs, such as the cost of establishing the plantation and purchasing agricultural equipment, (2) operating costs, 
like the costs for fertilizer and labour, and (3) benefits resulting from the revenues of selling Fresh Fruit Bunch 
(FFB). Certified farmers have additional costs related to certification, but also additional benefits in the form of a 
premium fee (resulting from the certificate) and, for the certified independent smallholders, a premium price 
(resulting from higher quality FFB).  
Second,  we assume that profitability  may  be influenced by governmental policies or programs such as 
fertilizer subsidies, and relationships between farmers and market chains, for example in the form of contract 
farming (Simmons, Winters, & Patrick, 2005) or, specifically for Indonesia, Nucleus Estate Smallholder 
schemes (NES). 
Third, we also assume that social economic characteristics, such as relatively high education, long 
experience, good access to agricultural extension programs, tenancy, and the presence of non-farm income may 
contribute to smallholder’s profit (Rahman, 2003).    
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework to assess profitability of certification adoption 
Fourth, following Simula et al. (2004), we distinguish between direct costs and benefits and indirect 
costs and benefits of certification (see Figure 2). The direct costs refer to all costs associated with the 
certification process, such as the auditing costs and costs to prepare for the certification process. Indirect costs 
result from activities that are required as part of the certification, such as document recording, and the costs for 
soil and water conservation.  
Direct benefits are monetary benefits directly resulting from certification (premium fee and premium 
price). The indirect benefits consist of monetary benefits (e.g. cost reductions resulting from economies of scale, 
higher revenues following better FFB quality, and reductions in FFB depreciation resulting from better 
harvesting practices and post harvesting treatments) and non-monetary benefits. The latter relate to human 
capital (for example, better knowledge), social capital (e.g. participation in farmer organizations) and natural 
capital (e.g. better environmental quality) (see Hidayat et al., 2015 for more information).    
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Source: adopted from Simula et al. (2004)  
Figure 2. Monetary costs and benefits of the certification adoption 
 
4. Research Methods 
In order to assess the profitability of certification adoption, we interviewed five groups of smallholders: (1) 
certified scheme smallholders, (2) non-certified scheme smallholders, (3) certified independent smallholders, (4) 
non-certified independent smallholders and (5) prospective independent smallholders. Prospective smallholders 
are non-certified independent smallholders who are in the preparation phase to become certified. Although they 
do not comply to all standards yet, they can be considered to be organized around a miller company already, and 
therefore generally receive higher prices for their products compared to non-certified independent smallholders. 
The surveyed smallholder groups were selected using cluster sampling techniques. We interviewed 214 
smallholders, 50 being drawn from each of the certified and noncertified groups (both scheme and independent) 
and 14 from the prospective smallholders. To guarantee data reliability we conducted interviews aimed at 
verification of the data with 7 informants: the head of a farmer association (N=1) and cooperative (N=1), 
plantation workers (N=2), experienced smallholders (N=2), and a Nucleus Company representative (N=1).  
To analyse whether certified smallholders gain more profit than non-certified smallholders, we 
calculated and compared the Net Present Value (NPV) of all smallholder groups1 through a two-step approach.  
                                                 
1 Alternative methods to measure the profitability of certification exist, for example, modelling the same smallholders with 
and without certification based on data about what changes as a result of certification. Although also offering relevant results, 
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In the first step we calculated the present nominal values of costs and benefits based on interviews with farmers. 
In these interviews we asked the farmers about the quantity of their FFB production/ kapling = 2ha/ year, the 
latest price received for their FFB, and the latest input costs. 
To estimate past and future costs and benefits, we asked the farmers to specify quantities of products 
used and sold in the past1 and we approached quantities of products in the future by interviewing farmers and 
agronomist palm oil experts. These quantities are multiplied with current prices to specify past and future costs 
and benefits in cash flow.    
Directly summing up these values to calculate the overall NPV of a plantation for its entire lifetime 
would neglect the influence of time preference. Therefore, in the second step we corrected all costs and benefits 
resulting from the first step- for time preference. We multiplied the numbers for costs and benefits that resulted 
from the first step by the compounded interest factor for the years in the past till the present time. We multiplied 
values in the future by the discount factor for the years between the current plantation’s age and 25 years. The 
used formula of NPV equals: 
          (1) 
     (2) 
      (3) 
Where, 
 = Present value benefit year-t; where compounding2 is used if 0≤t≤z (for the past, and discounting3 is 
used if z≤t≤n (for the future) 
 = Present value cost year-t; where compounding4 is used if 0≤t≤z (for the past), and discounting5 is 
used if z≤t≤n (for the future) 
  = year-t 
z  = age of the plantation (representing the present point of time) 
n  = project life time (25 years, based on the economic life-time of oil palm trees) 
 = real discount rate (5.58 %)6 
Following our earlier mentioned interpretation of profitability we consider certification profitable if the 
NPV of certified farmers is higher than the NPV of non-certified farmers (see Figure 3). However, to be sure that 
differences in NPV can be attributed to certification, we included three control variables that are largely believed 
to influence profit in our analysis: 
Socio-economic characteristics to control for the potential effects of education, experience and the 
receipt of governmental support on profits. These characteristics were included in a regression analysis7. We 
define the average of last year’s monthly profit (B-C) as dependent variable whereas the independent variable of 
certification refers to the level of compliance with the certification standard (1=non-compliance/ uncertified, 
2=in the process to certification, but not fully certified yet and 3=full compliance/ certified) (CERT). Subsequent 
independent variables include: government support (GOV_USED), education (EDU), experience (EXP), income 
from other activities than oil palm plantation (OTH_I), status of smallholders/scheme or independent 
smallholders (STATUS), ownership of other oil palm plantations (OTH_LAND), and productivity per kapling 
(PROD). The equation of the regression analysis equals:  
INCOM_MON = f (CERT, GOV_USED, EDU, EXP, OTH_I, STATUS, OTH_LAND, PROD)  
                                                                                                                                                        
it may neglect profit-related factors that only apply to one specific group of smallholders (independent, scheme or 
prospective). Therefore we decided to follow the approach as suggested in this article. 
1 Different from prices, farmers record quantities of products used and sold in a detailed way. 
2 ; where  if z≤t≤n; FT = 
future value, PV=Present Value, t=year-t, z=age of plantation (in the year of observation), n=project life time of the plantation  
3  ; where  if 0≤t≤z; PastV = Past value, PV=Present 
Value, t=year-t, z=age of plantation (in the year of observation) 
4 See footnote 8  
5 See footnote 9 
6 We use real interest rates (real discount rate) because we also used constant or current prices to estimate past and future 
benefits and costs in step 1 (instead of nominal prices). The real interest rate is calculated by subtracting inflation rates from 
nominal interest rates: 12% (based on the average (nominal) commercial credit interest in Indonesia in 2014) - 6.42% (based 
on average of inflation rate in 2014) = 5.58%  
7 Although we see that it may be reasonable to include the age of a plantation as independent variable,  it could not be done 
for this case, as we have already included the experience of farmers (in years) as an independent variable. The majority of 
farmers are under their first plantation cycle. Therefore, the plantation’s age and the farmers’ experience are –in almost all 
cases- similar. Including both would result in severe multicollinearity problems. The selection of variables results from the 
literature overview provided in section on the conceptual framework and relies on Rahman (2003); Simmons et al. (2005)  
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If the variable certification (CERT) significantly influences last year’s monthly profit (B-C), we can 
conclude that certification explains variation in profitability.  
Organization. To see whether differences in NPV mainly result from certification or from a better 
organizational structure in which the certified farmers are embedded, we included the NPV of prospective 
independent farmers (who are organized already, but not certified yet) in our analysis. We calculated the NPV 
values for this group and performed an independent T-test to statistically compare the differences in profit 
between the different smallholder groups.      
Pre-condition before certification. Hidayat et al. (2015) observed that certified smallholders may have 
been better off in terms of productivity before they became certified compared to non-certified farmers. In a first 
step, we therefore used the independent T-test to compare the productivity of certified smallholders before and 
after certification adoption. If this test indeed reveals no significant differences between the productivity before 
and after certification adoption, we can conclude that the certified smallholders have been better off, and 
continue to control for the influence of productivity on profitability by defining the NPV of a so-called 
preliminary group. This group comprises certified smallholders that are treated as non-certified by leaving out all 
costs and benefits directly related to certification. In Figure 3, the criteria for profitability that are adopted in this 
study are summarized. 
The second research question considers the profitability of certification in the case that smallholders 
have to pay the costs of certification themselves. Although external stakeholders, i.e. companies, NGOs, and 
other donors, currently pay certification costs for the farmers, the long-term continuation of this support is 
uncertain (Hidayat et al., 2015).  This issue was addressed by complementing the NPV with a sensitivity analysis 
(Campbell & Brown, 2003, p. 195) in which we included certification costs and premiums as critical variables. 
We performed the sensitivity analysis under a so-called self-funded scenario, which is the scenario wherein 
certified smallholders pay all certification costs themselves (while maintaining the premium prices and fee). For 
the certified scheme smallholders we consider it likely that they will receive the premium fee themselves in the 
self-funded scenario; i.e. if they have to pay the costs themselves, they will also receive the benefits themselves. 
Other institutional arrangements between smallholders and their nucleus company do not change in the self-
funded scenario. This implies that the nucleus company remains responsible for providing agricultural assistance 
(training), monitoring and paying the RSPO membership fee (as in the RSPO, the out-grower smallholders are 
part of the company and registered under the company’s name). Compared to the procedure followed to answer 
the first research question, we included the certification costs in the calculation of the NPV for the certified 
farmers. Next, we also included the benefits from receiving premium fees in the calculation of the NPV of 
certified scheme smallholders.  
Figure 3. Criteria for profitability: Certification is profitable if the certified NPVs are higher than the 
NPVs of the controlling groups (i.e. non-certified smallholders, prospective smallholders and preliminary 
smallholders (those who were better off already before joining certification)) 
If the results of the sensitivity analysis show that certification is not profitable under the self-funded 
condition, we employ a switching value analysis to determine the size of a minimum premium fee to make 
certification profitable. To also consider uncertainties regarding the provision of premium prices, that heavily 
  
NPV non certified 
within the same 
category (a=scheme/ 
b=independent) 
NPV prospective 
independent c 
NPV without within the same 
category (d=scheme/ 
e=independent) 
NPV certified scheme  
(A) 
Profitability of 
certification for 
scheme smallholders 
(O) = (A-a) 
NA Profitability of certification  for 
scheme smallholders corrected by 
all factors  that might influence 
yield and profit such as age of 
plantation, agricultural practices 
used; only consider direct costs and 
benefits of certification  
(R) = (A-d) 
NPV certified independent 
(B) 
Profitability of 
certification for 
independent 
smallholders  
(P) = (B-b) 
Profitability of 
certification for 
independent 
smallholders 
corrected by 
influence of 
organization on 
profit  
(Q) = (B-c) 
Profitability of certification for 
independent smallholders corrected 
by all factors that might influence 
yield and profit such as age of 
plantation, agricultural practices 
used; only consider direct costs and 
benefits of certification  
(S) = (B-e) 
The adoption of certification is profitable for the smallholders if O, P, Q, R and S are positive.      
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depend on company policies, we calculate the size of the premium fee in two situations: (1) premium prices are 
available and (2) premium prices are not available. Premium prices are paid per ton CPO or Palm Kernel Oil 
(PKO). Based on interviews with employees from the nucleus companies and heads of independent smallholder 
associations we equal 1 ton of the scheme smallholders’ FFB to 21% CPO and 5% PKO, and 1 ton of the 
independent smallholders’ FFB to 19.4% CPO and 2% PKO.  
 
5. Study Sites and Characteristics of the Smallholder Respondents  
If the results of the sensitivity analysis show that certification is not profitable under the self-funded condition, 
we employ a switching value analysis to determine the size of a minimum premium fee to make certification 
profitable. To also consider uncertainties regarding the provision of premium prices, that heavily depend on 
company policies, we calculate the size of the premium fee in two situations: (1) premium prices are available 
and (2) premium prices are not available. Premium prices are paid per ton CPO or Palm Kernel Oil (PKO). 
Based on interviews with employees from the nucleus companies and heads of independent smallholder 
associations we equal 1 ton of the scheme smallholders’ FFB to 21% CPO and 5% PKO, and 1 ton of the 
independent smallholders’ FFB to 19.4% CPO and 2% PKO. 
This study was conducted in two important oil palm producer regions in Indonesia, i.e. Riau and South 
Sumatra. These study sites were purposely selected as the first certified independent smallholders and the first 
certified scheme smallholders reside in Riau and South Sumatera respectively. The non-certified and certified 
smallholders were selected within the same district and therefore located in vicinity of each other. Almost all 
scheme smallholders and certified independent smallholders are Javanese ex-transmigrants, while the non-
certified independent smallholders consisted of Javanese migrants and locals (Melayunese and Bataknese).  
Most smallholders are between 41 and 60 years old and have more than 15 years’ experience in 
managing oil palm plantations; 89% of the respondents are men and most smallholders have had a low 
education. For 96% of the smallholders, palm oil encompasses their main source of income. The average land 
area owned by the certified scheme smallholders equals 3.90 hectare (ha) and does not differ substantially for the 
non-certified scheme, certified independent, and non-certified independent smallholders, as their land ownership 
covers 3.21 ha, 3.87 ha and 3.82 ha respectively. The prospective smallholders own, however, relatively smaller 
plots: 2.21 ha on average. Approximately 33% of the smallholders own both independent plantations and scheme 
plantations, while 42% of the respondents solely own independent plantations and 25% only scheme plantations. 
The smallholders who own both types of plantation are treated either as independent or scheme smallholder, 
based on the status of their farmer organization.  
All plantations covered by this research are matured, although the average age of the plantations differs 
between the smallholder groups. The scheme smallholder’s plantations are relatively old (22 years in the case of 
the certified scheme smallholders, and 25 years for non-certified scheme smallholders), which implies that their 
productivity will steadily decrease. The plantations of the independent smallholders are younger: 15 years on 
average in the case of the certified independent smallholders and 13 year for the non-certified smallholders. This 
means that these plantations are currently on, or just before, the top of their productivity. As we consider and 
calculate the profitability of the entire palm oil plantation life-span (t=25, see section 4 on research methods) 
these differences in the plantations’ age will be considered in our study and therefore not bias our results. 
 
6. Profitability of Palm Oil Certification under Actual Conditions 
Our profitability analysis suggests that oil palm certification is currently profitable for scheme and independent 
smallholders. The NPV of certified scheme smallholders is 35% or $48,919.72 higher than the NPV of the non-
certified scheme smallholders. For independent smallholders, certification is even more profitable as the NPV of 
certified independent smallholders is 89% or $39,279.38 higher than for the non-certified independent 
smallholders (Table 1). Although the certified scheme smallholders can be considered the most profitable palm 
oil farmer group, the independent smallholders relatively gain most when they become certified (e.g. a 89% 
increase in profit).    
Table 1. Net Present Values of smallholders’ oil palm plantations 
No. Type of smallholder Certification NPV ($) 
1 Scheme Certified 187,854.23 
2 Scheme Non-certified 138,934.52 
3 Independent Certified 83,603.19 
4 Independent Non-certified 44,323.81 
5 Independent Prospective non-certified 62,368.45 
The certified scheme smallholders have a higher NPV than the non-certified scheme smallholders 
because they have higher benefits (32%) and lower operating costs (9%) (See Table 2 and Table 3). The higher 
benefits result from higher productivity, and following from this, higher FFB sales. The productivity of the 
certified scheme smallholders reaches on average 25 ton/year/ha, whereas the non-certified scheme smallholders 
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produce around 19 ton/year/ha. The certified scheme smallholder’s premium fee is received and managed by the 
farmer organizations that also pay the certification costs. In terms of operating and investment costs, the certified 
scheme smallholders pay relatively lower costs than the non-certified scheme smallholders (see Table 3). This 
results from the lower costs for the plantation’s establishment and lower costs for spraying. The latter can be 
explained by referring to their centralized plantation management system that allows benefiting from purchasing 
large quantities for lower prices and changing agricultural practices that require less chemical usage. 
Table 2. Benefits of the oil palm smallholders, average value per year1,2 
Smallholder group FFB selling ($/year/kapling) Premium price ($/year) Premium fee ($/year) Total benefit 
Certified scheme  6,492.39 - - 6,492.39 
Non-certified scheme  4,900.45 - - 4,900.45 
Certified independent 4,950.64 197.14*) 60.00*) 5,207.78 
Non-certified independent  3,037.33 - - 3,037.33 
Prospective independent  4,280.38 177.02*) - 4,457.40 
Note:*) The average is counted by considering the period in which the smallholders have adopted the 
certification: for the scheme smallholders this equals 6 years and for the independent smallholders 13 years.   
The difference between the NPV of the certified and non-certified independent smallholders’ results 
from higher benefits, and not from lower costs as was the case for the scheme smallholders. A higher 
productivity, resulting from changing practices, again explains why certified independent smallholders have 
higher benefits than the non-certified independent smallholders. (On average, the productivity of the non-
certified smallholders equals 12 ton/year/ha, compared to 15 ton/year/ha for the prospective smallholders and 17 
ton/year/ha for the certified independent smallholders). Moreover, a stronger organization opens opportunities 
for the certified independent smallholders to bypass middlemen through directly selling their FFB to a Miller 
Company. This results in higher selling prices that lie around $17 (per ton FFB) higher than the prices for FFB 
received by the non-certified smallholders. Additionally, the certified independent smallholders receive a 
premium price of about $5/ton FFB (average premium price of the last year) or $197.14/year/kapling from the 
Affiliated Miller Company. The sale of Green Palm certificates (i.e. premium fees) offers another 
$60.00/year/kapling to the certified independent smallholders. The prospective independent smallholders do not 
receive premium fees from the Green Palm certificate sales yet, but they do benefit from higher FFB prices as 
they are already affiliated to a miller company (see Table 2).   
Table 3. Costs for Indonesian oil palm smallholders, average value per year3 
Costs structure Certified scheme 
Non-
certified 
scheme 
Certified 
independent 
Non-certified 
independent 
Prospective 
independent 
Investment costs 351.27 389.37 388.85 293.26 271.47 
Land - - 226.04 197.10 164.03 
Agricultural Equipment 74.78 79.18 85.64 51.96 51.96 
Plantation establishment 276.49 290.53 47.37 32.88 39.10 
Land clearing - - 22.02 9.68 9.94 
Rehabilitation of Plantation - 7.93 - - - 
FFB collecting place - 11.73 7.78 1.63 6.44 
Contribution of farmers to association /costs 
of certification 
- - 30.75 - 31.78 
Operating costs 1,390.34 1,529.85 1,439.04 1,020.78 1,341.39 
Plantation maintenance - - - - - 
Spraying 76.12 176.51 102.45 138.46 158.54 
Irrigation and tapak kuda4 maintenance 7.97 22.62 5.26 39.75 - 
Fertilizer application 442.14 469.04 744.05 629.38 665.94 
Pruning 88.66 103.01 73.24 70.14 36.42 
Management Fee 16.08 112.49 80.68 - 71.11 
Road maintenance 45.77 16.08 54.80 - 77.74 
Harvesting 385.85 358.59 192.59 143.05 125.93 
Weighing - 59.99 40.34 - 35.56 
Transportation costs 327.76 211.52 145.63 - 170.16 
The cost structure also differs between scheme and independent certified farmers (see Table 3). 
                                                 
1 The average is counted by considering the period in which the smallholders have adopted the certification: for the scheme 
smallholders this equals 6 years and for the independent smallholders 13 years.   
2 Standard deviation: overall=28%; certified scheme=14%; non-certified scheme=20%; certified independent=17%; 
prospective independent=29%; non-certified independent=34% 
3  Coefficient of variation (CV): overall=28%; certified scheme=11%; non-certified scheme=22%; certified 
independent=15%; prospective independent=24%; non-certified independent=42%. The CV for non-certified independent is 
relatively high due to variation in input use, as a consequence of differences in capital ownership. It further implies higher 
CV of profit gained by non-certified independent smallholders. 
4 Tapak kuda (horseshoe) is a technique of soil and water conservation in oil palm plantation which located on sloped areas 
(3◦-28◦) 
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Whereas the certification costs of the scheme smallholders are paid by the affiliated Miller Companies, the 
certified independent smallholders pay the certification costs themselves. The results furthermore indicate that 
certified independent smallholders have higher investment- and operating costs compared to their non-certified 
counterparts. This can be explained by the fact that non-certified independent smallholders generally have a lack 
of capital (Molenaar, Persch-Orth, Lord, & Harms, 2013), therefore, they often used low quality of seedlings, 
limited agricultural equipment e.g. manual weeding tools, no adequate safety tools, and they apply land 
clearance with slash and burning, which is commonly done by family labor. Moreover, non-certified independent 
smallholders are not organized, and therefore do not have to pay management fees. Next, although bypassing 
middlemen may result in higher FFB prices, it may also reduce income for the independent smallholders, as the 
middlemen pay for the post-harvesting expenses of non-certified independent smallholders (e.g. transportation 
costs). In addition, due to the lack of capital the non-certified independent (Molenaar et al., 2013), smallholders 
generally use lower amounts of fertilizers and commonly use family labour for pruning and harvesting, which 
further reduces their monetary costs. Only some operating costs (e.g. spraying and irrigation) are higher for the 
non-certified independent smallholders than for the certified independent smallholders as the former generally 
apply blanket spraying (or total spraying), which is banned by the RSPO, and involves higher costs. Irrigation 
costs only play a minor role in explaining differences in profit as it is only applicable to young plantations; 
maintenance is however  applicable for the entire  plantation life time.    
      
7. Controlling the Relation between Certification and Profitability for Organization, Socio-Demographic 
Characteristics, Governmental Support and Pre-Conditions  
Although the results in section 6 seem to indicate a positive relationship between certification and profit, we 
want to verify this relation through a regression analysis wherein we also include other variables (see the section 
4, on research methods). First, the regression analysis (see Table 4) shows that certification significantly and 
positively contributes to smallholder’s profit (P=0.001). Second, the inclusion of an organization variable in the 
profit analysis for the independent smallholders indicates that the organized (non-certified) independent 
smallholders obtain significantly more profit than the non-certified smallholders (P=0.011, see Table 5). The 
profit may further increase if the smallholders fully comply with the certification (P=0.013, see Table 5). 
Certification therefore seems to be an important vehicle to increase profit in the sense that it opens opportunities 
for better organization in relation to the Miller Companies, and for better access to training. Better organization 
ultimately leads to benefits in terms of higher FFB prices and improved productivity.   
Table 4. The results of the regression analysis: we observe significant effects of certification, status and 
productivity on profit. 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -956.833 174.651 
 
-5.479 0.000   
Certification1 113.19 33.034 0.08 3.426 0.001 0.624 1.603 
Other income -34.908 140.793 -0.005 -0.248 0.804 0.892 1.121 
Other land outside current land 29.493 61.158 0.01 0.482 0.63 0.773 1.294 
Experience -6.773 3.93 -0.034 -1.724 0.086 0.845 1.184 
Education 7.079 8.951 0.015 0.791 0.43 0.977 1.024 
Productivity per kavling 126.738 3.326 0.899 38.107 0.000 0.607 1.647 
Dummy Government support2 33.682 63.884 0.012 0.527 0.599 0.628 1.592 
Status3 183.258 68.683 0.067 2.668 0.008 0.542 1.845 
F-test=344.377; R2=0.931; Prob-F=0.000 
 
                                                 
1The scores  describe the level of  compliance with the certification standard (1=non-compliance/ uncertified, 2=in the 
process to certification, but not fully certified yet and 3=full compliance/ certified)  
2 Dummy government support: 1=receive government support; 0=do not receive government support 
3 Status: 1=scheme smallholders; 0=independent smallholders 
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Table 5. The results of the T-test analysis for fertilizer expenses, productivity, price, and profit among 
smallholder groups 
 certified vs non-
certified Independent 
smallholders 
Prospective vs certified 
independent 
smallholders 
prospective vs non-
certified independent 
smallholders 
non-certified vs 
certified scheme 
smallholders 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Fertilizers 
expenses ($) 
0.002 194.6123 0.383 -57.7739 0.06 136.8384 0.281 -55.5086 
Productivity 
(ton/kavling/year) 
0.000 13.0732 0.003 -7.3866 0.055 5.6866 0.000 -6.89 
Price ($/ton) 0.000 17.84 0.601 -0.14 0.000 17.7 0.866 0.167 
Profit 
($/kavling/year) 
0.000 1799.282 0.013 -882.924 0.011 916.3584 0.000 -1223.4 
Third, Table 4 shows that smallholders’ profit is not influenced by governmental support and socio-
economic variables such as education, experience, ownership of other plantations, or having alternative sources 
of income. Certification, status and pre-condition before certification productivity, however, significantly 
influence smallholder’s profit. The significant and positive relation between certification and profit validates our 
argumentation in section 6.  The significant effect of status refers to the fact that scheme smallholders (both 
certified and non-certified) gain significantly more profit than the independent smallholders. This can be 
explained by referring to the scheme smallholders’ higher productivity, the higher prices for their FFB, and the 
technological support they receive from their NES Company. Further, Table 4 shows that productivity is the 
most important variable explaining variation in the smallholders’ profit. The higher the productivity of the 
smallholders, the higher their profit.    
Fourth, and following from the important role of productivity in explaining profit, we analysed the 
potential influence of pre-condition before certification productivity on profit. Table 6 indicates a significant 
difference in productivity before and after independent smallholders become certified. We can say that, for the 
independent smallholders, their productivity and therefore also their profit goes up as a result of certification. For 
the scheme smallholders, however, we could not identify significant differences in productivity before and after 
the adoption of certification. This result indicates that the certified scheme smallholders may have been better off 
already before they joined the certification.  
Table 6. The result of T-test analysis of the certified smallholders before and after the certification adoption 
 Scheme smallholders 
(before and after) 
Independent smallholders  
(before and after) t-test for Equality of Means t-test for Equality of Means 
t Sig. (2-tailed) t Sig. (2-tailed) 
Productivity 1.271 0.219 3.966 0.002 
FFB sale*) (Revenues) 1.096 0.287 4.221 0.001 
Note: *) It is analysed based on price in 2014 
Figure 4 (last column) subsequently shows the effects of certification on NPV corrected for the fact that 
(scheme) smallholders were already better off in terms of productivity before they adopted certification (see 
previous paragraph). The results show that the certified scheme smallholders still increase their profit by 
adopting certification, although the additional profit is relatively low (0.06%).  
 NPV non certified within 
the same category 
(a=scheme/ b=independent) 
NPV prospective independent 
c 
NPV without within the same category 
(d=scheme/ e=independent) 
 (a= $138,934.52)  (d= $187,742.55) 
NPV certified scheme 
(A= $187,854.23) 
Profitability of certification 
for scheme smallholders 
NA Profitability of certification  for scheme 
smallholders corrected by all factors  that 
might influence yield and profit such as age 
of plantation, agricultural practices used; only 
consider direct costs and benefits of 
certification 
 (O)=(A-a)= $48,919.72  (R)=(A-d) = $111.68 
 (b=$44,323.81) (c= $62,368.45) (e= $81,320.65) 
NPV certified independent 
(B= $83,603.19) 
Profitability of certification 
for independent 
smallholders 
Profitability of certification 
for independent smallholders 
corrected by influence of 
organization on profit 
Profitability of certification for independent 
smallholders corrected by all factors that 
might influence yield and profit such as age 
of plantation, agricultural practices used; only 
consider direct costs and benefits of 
certification 
 (P) = (B-b)= $39,279.38 (Q)=(B-c)= $21,234.73 (S)=(B-e)= $2,282.54 
The adoption of certification is profitable for the smallholders if O, P, Q, R and S are positive. 
Figure 4. Summary of profitability of the certification adoption under actual condition 
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Figure 4 shows that under the actual condition, where smallholders do not (fully) pay the costs of 
certification, certification adoption is profitable for all types of smallholders. Certified actors have a higher NPV 
than the uncertified actors. Although productivity and organization play a role in explaining differences in profit 
as well, certification still contributes positively to the smallholder’s profit, also for well-organized non-certified 
smallholders with a relatively high productivity. To what extent the certification can be considered profitable 
depends on the initial performance of the smallholders as adopters e.g. productivity, and their status (scheme or 
independent).     
 
8. On the Self-Funded Condition: Profitability of the Certification Adoption 
Under the self-funded scenario, in which the smallholders pay all certification costs themselves, certification 
adoption will still be profitable for the independent smallholders, but not for the scheme smallholders who were 
already better off at the moment they become involved in certification (see Figure 5). The NPV of certified 
independent smallholders in this scenario is still much higher (e.i. 84%) than for the non-certified independent 
smallholders. The well-organized independent smallholders also still receive 31% higher profits (about 
$19,308.82 in terms of NPV) if they fully adopt certification. Scheme smallholders with a low initial 
productivity improve their profitability by 35% in the self-funded scenario.  However, for the scheme 
smallholders who have been better off (e.i. who had a high initial productivity), certification will not be 
economically appealing if they have to pay all certification costs themselves. Even if they receive the present 
premium fees, certification adoption will not be profitable as the scheme smallholders’ NPV decreases by 0.14% 
(equal to $259.65).  
 
  
 
  
 NPV non certified 
within the same 
category (a=scheme/ 
b=independent)  
 NPV prospective 
independent c  
 NPV without within the same 
category (d=scheme/ e=independent)  
  (a= $138,934.52)   (d= $187,742.55)                           
 NPV certified 
scheme   
(A= $ 
187,482.91) 
 Profitability of 
certification for 
scheme smallholders  
 NA   Profitability of certification  for 
scheme smallholders corrected by all 
factors  that might influence yield and 
profit such as age of plantation, 
agricultural practices used; only 
consider direct costs and benefits of 
certification   
 (O)=(A-a)=$ 
48,584.39 
(R)=(A-d) = $ (-259.65)                                      
  (b=$44,323.81) (c= $62,368.45) (e= $81,320.65) 
 NPV certified 
independent 
(B= $ 
81,677.28) 
 Profitability of 
certification for 
independent 
smallholders   
 Profitability of 
certification for 
independent 
smallholders corrected 
by influence of 
organization on profit   
 Profitability of certification for 
independent smallholders corrected 
by all factors that might influence 
yield and profit such as age of 
plantation, agricultural practices used; 
only consider direct costs and benefits 
of certification   
                          (P) = (B-b) 
=$37,353.47  
(Q) = (B-c) = 
$19,308.82  
(S) = (B-e) = $356.63  
 The adoption of certification is profitable for the smallholders if O, P, Q, R and S are positive.       
Figure 5. Profitability of certification adoption in the self-funded scenario 
Table 7 further specifies the certification costs for scheme and independent smallholders in the self-
funded scenario. These costs are much lower for the scheme smallholders (56%) than for the independent 
smallholders. This results from the fact that some costs are necessary to be paid by independent smallholders but 
not by the scheme smallholders (for example data verification costs, certification group establishment 
(Association), RSPO membership costs, compliance to legal aspects (Cultivation Registration Certificate/Surat 
Tanda Daftar Budidaya/STDB) and the operating costs of farmer associations). Moreover, due to the 
connectedness of scheme smallholders with their Nucleus Company, some certification costs, like the costs of 
training and internal audits, can be saved as they are taken up by the Nucleus Company.  
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Table 7. Annual costs of certification adoption in the self-funded scenario 
Costs of the certification component 
Certified scheme*) 
($/year) 
Certified 
independent*) 
($/year) 
Direct costs  44.75   65.94  
Audit implementation 0.23 - 
Capacity building and training - 13.49 
Data verification - 0.22 
External audit 44.35 37.03 
Follow up audit 0.18 8.02 
Internal audit - 3.25 
organization establishment - 2.86 
RSPO membership - 1.07 
Indirect costs  56.07   164.82  
Document recording 36.00 5.89 
Environmental and biodiversity standard compliance 6.24 2.60 
Farmer organization meeting and for independent smallholders 
also incentive for ICS  
8.10 130.92 
Legal aspect compliance (STDB/ Cultivation Registration 
Certificate) 
- 
7.76 
operational costs of organization - 5.82 
Social standard compliance 5.74 11.84 
Total Costs of the certification per year 100.83 230.76 
Note: *) The average is counted by considering the period in which the smallholders have adopted the 
certification: for the scheme smallholders this equals 6 years and for the independent smallholders 13 years.   
In the scenario we assume that not the farmer groups, but the smallholders receive the premium fees 
and prices (see section 4). This implies that the certified scheme smallholders receive a premium fee in the worth 
of $37.35/ year, while the certified independent smallholders maintain their $197.14/year premium price and 
$60.00/year premium fee (Table 8). 
Table 8. Benefits of certification in the self-funded scenario 
Smallholder group Premium price ($/year) Premium fee ($/year) 
Certified scheme - 37.35*) 
Certified independent 197.14*) 60.00*) 
Note: *) The average is counted by considering the period in which the smallholders have adopted the 
certification: for the scheme smallholders this equals 6 years and for the independent smallholders 13 years.   
To transform certification into a profitable investment project for the scheme smallholders in the self-
funded scenario, a minimum premium fee of $8.6/ton CPO, which is roughly twice as much as the fee that is 
currently received by the scheme smallholders’ organization ($4/ton CPO), is necessary. The minimum premium 
fee decreases if the scheme smallholders adopt certification from the beginning of the plantation period, as this 
may allow costs to be distributed over a longer period. In the case of early adoption, a minimum premium fee of 
$8.5/ton CPO is necessary to maintain the same profitability compared to the pre-condition before certification 
(break-even point). As this is still a significantly higher amount compared to the current fees, it is questionable 
whether certification will be profitable for scheme smallholders in the self-funded scenario.   
In the long-term, the receipt of a premium price is uncertain as it relies on the policies of affiliated 
companies to provide an incentive for independent smallholders of being certified and applying the best 
management practices. If the independent smallholders do not receive premium prices anymore, but nonetheless 
pay all certification costs themselves, certification adoption is no longer profitable for them: the NPV will go 
down by 5%. In this case, the independent smallholders need to receive a minimum of $29.7/ ton CPO to reach 
the break-even point. Considering the rate of the actual premium fee for independent smallholders, which  
reaches $15/ton (Wangrakdiskul & Yodpijit, 2013), the sustainability certification may only be profitable for 
independent smallholders if they receive a  premium fee that is 93% higher than the actual premium fee. 
However, this seems to be an unrealistic situation, particularly as the supply of Crude Sustainable Palm Oil 
(CSPO) is already much higher than the demand, leading to an oversupply of 55%1. Given this oversupply, it is 
unlikely that premium fees will increase dramatically. Therefore, certification will likely not be profitable for 
independent smallholders in the self-funded scenario wherein premium prices will be cut.  
                                                 
1 CSPO production in 2014= 11,909,121 tonnes; CSPO uptake in 2014= 5,349,666 tonnes 
(http://www.rspo.org/about/impacts) 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.18, 2016 
 
58 
9.  Beyond Direct Monetary Benefits 
Next to monetary benefits, certification contributed positively to non-monetary aspects. These aspects include 
ease of selling FFB, participation in farmer organizations, access to knowledge and training, better safety and 
health, environmental conservation and biodiversity.  
After joining the RSPO, the independent smallholders perceive better access to a miller company, 
which made it easier to sell their FFB. However, for scheme smallholders, certification does not contribute to 
better market access, because they are already contractually bound to a miller company from the moment they 
join the Nucleus Estate Smallholder (NES) scheme.  
Both independent smallholders and scheme smallholders argue that certification enhances the exchange 
of knowledge and participation of smallholders in farmer organizations. Farmer organization meetings are 
attended more frequently by certified scheme smallholders compared to non-certified scheme smallholders. 
Similarly, the participation of certified independent smallholders in farmer organizations increases after they 
become certified. Through these regular meetings, members have the opportunity to become informed about 
activities undertaken by the farmer organization, which contributes to transparency and accountability, and about 
recent developments in, or affecting, the palm oil sector.  
Further, certification is believed to improve the safety and health of farmers, both for the independent 
and scheme smallholders. The farmers are, for example, required to use safety tools and instructed on how to use 
safer equipment. The health condition of the farmers is checked regularly and health care expenses are covered 
by cooperatives or associations. The latter does not only lead to better health, but also to lower expenses (around 
$11.67 - $ 158.13 for medical expenses and $26 - $120 regarding the redundancy of an income-free recovery 
period after accidents that may occur without certification). 
Certification also creates awareness about the importance of environmental conservation (Brandi et al., 
2013). Certified farmers arrange the palm oil midrib in the plantation in a specific way, planting Bamboo or 
other trees along the river and do not apply chemical substances along the river side to reduce erosion and 
pollution of waterways.  Almost all certified scheme and independent smallholders apply soil and water 
conservation techniques, which they evaluate as a positive effect of certification.   
Protecting biodiversity is one important objective of the RSPO and was –among other causes- 
threatened by illegal hunting practices. However, we found that most smallholders, also those who are not 
certified (yet), do not hunt protected animals. The smallholders prefer to use natural predators to get rid of 
unwanted species, but, in alignment  with Brandi et al. (2013), we found that certification increases knowledge 
about integrated pest management (IPM). Therefore, besides leaving useful animals, such as mice-eating snakes, 
in their plantation, certified scheme- and independent smallholders tend to plant Turnera ulmifolia (yellow alder) 
as a habitat for natural predators consuming bagworms (moths damaging oil palm trees),  and build owl nests as 
a natural way to contribute to eradicating pests. The protection of biodiversity implies that the smallholders use 
less chemicals in their plantation. It, therefore, contributes to a better health and prevents soil degradation 
ultimately contributing to sustained long-term income.  
 
10. Conclusion 
This paper contributes to our understanding of the profitability of palm oil certification for Indonesian 
smallholders and to methodological and conceptual advancements in the academic field of sustainability 
certification. Our conceptualization of certification as a profitable investment project is rather novel as it not only 
considers the profit resulting from certification, but also compares this profit to the profit of non-certified actors. 
Smallholders will only consider certification adoption if they can increase their profit compared to their current, 
non-certified situation. Methodologically we presented a procedure to include a more realistic range of costs and 
benefits for both certified and non-certified farmers. By doing so we also considered direct and indirect costs and 
benefits of certification, as well as the entire lifespan of a plantation. Neglecting the entire lifespan may lead to 
misleading conclusions as a plantation’s productivity, and therefore profit, strongly depends on its age. Next, 
some costs that mainly apply to young plantations (e.g. irrigation), may be neglected if the analysis only 
considers matured plantations. Given these novelties, this research can be considered to offer a clearer and more 
nuanced picture of the profitability of sustainability certification.  
Under the actual condition, in which the smallholders do not pay the certification costs, certification 
adoption is profitable for all different types of smallholders (scheme smallholders and independent 
smallholders). To what extent the adoption is profitable depends on the smallholder’s conditions before they 
adopt the certification. In the self-funded scenario wherein smallholders pay all certification costs themselves, 
certification remains profitable for smallholders except for scheme smallholders who were already better off 
before certification. Certification might still be profitable for them if they would receive $8.6/ton CPO. 
However, as this amount is twice as much as what is currently received by their organization, we doubt whether 
certification will ever be profitable for these smallholders in the self-funded scenario. For independent 
smallholders, premium prices turned out to be crucial to speak of certification
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in the self-funded scenario. A collapse of premium prices implies that the independent smallholders would need 
$29.7/ ton CPO premium fee to reach a breakeven position. This amount of fee is however twice as much as the 
current premium fee. Considering the current oversupply of sustainable palm oil (SPO), it seems that an 100% 
increase in premium fee is not realistic. Therefore, it is very unlikely that certification remains profitable for 
independent smallholders if they do not receive premium prices anymore in the self-funded scenario.  
The practical relevance of this study is two-fold. First, it may support the RSPO’s intention to bring in 
more smallholders. The results indicate that in the present situation, certification is financially profitable for all 
types of smallholders. Given the fact that financial considerations are among the most important drivers for 
smallholders to join certification, communication of the results may result in higher smallholder adoption rates 
and make smallholders decide to invest upfront costs with the prospect of higher profits. Although investment 
costs for independent smallholders can be substantially limited by making use of hand-tools and family labour, 
the time needed to develop a well running plantation will be relatively high. It may be good to smoothen the 
access of independent smallholders to credit. We have also seen that certification adoption is not only profitable 
for farmers with young plantations, but also for farmers with old plantations (20-25 years). This indicates that 
certification as an investment project already offers tangible benefits in the short term. What we have 
furthermore seen is that certification (although still being profitable) does not significantly contribute to a better 
productivity for the scheme smallholders. The explanation is that these smallholders were already better off in 
terms of productivity before they became involved in the certification process. The question why the certification 
process with its trainings and focus on Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) does not succeed to increase the 
productivity of this group of smallholders needs further investigation. Possibly, the plantation’s age may play a 
role in this, or the level and intensity of trainings that are (sometimes) already provided to scheme smallholders 
by the affiliated companies. 
Second, it may contribute to better targeting certification programs (privately e.g. RSPO and publicly 
e.g. ISPO) for the benefit of the smallholders. We furthermore found that the organization of farmers around a 
miller company significantly contributes to higher profits. Such an organization assures higher FFB prices, lower 
costs, and better opportunities to structurally sell FFB. In the current structure, however, it is impossible for 
independent smallholders to become organized around a miller company without being in the process towards 
certification. Certification in this scenario will still be profitable, but also implies a rather long and sometimes 
difficult process to comply with all formal requirements. Organization on the other hand, would be a faster less 
complicated process if it is focused around an agreement between farmer groups and a miller company. Investing 
in organization may therefore be an effective form of government involvement, especially as our results indicate 
that governmental provision of seeds and fertilizer does not contribute to farmer’s profits. A further exploration 
of the ineffectiveness of current governmental programs to increase profits, and the potential role of the 
government in organizing farmers around miller companies, would be an interesting topic for further research. 
Furthermore, if certification will turn out to be a self-funded project, it is absolutely crucial that premium prices 
will be maintained. Otherwise, certified farmers will need unrealistically high amounts of premium fee, which 
most likely implies that certification adoption will no longer be profitable.  
This study reveals the importance of relations between farmer organizations, certification and the ability 
of farmers to improve their profit. However, the exact interrelations between these components, as well as their 
effects (individually, but also holistically) on smallholder’s livelihoods remain unclear. Particularly the question 
whether strengthening the organization of farmers, without certification, would contribute significantly and 
positively to the smallholders’ livelihoods, and how and to what extent certification could potentially play an 
additional role in this, deserves further investigation. An example of such a study applied to coffee certification 
can be found in Ibnu, Offermans, and Glasbergen (2016). 
In next research, it may also be interesting to investigate how profit would change if the institutional 
arrangements between certified scheme smallholders and their affiliated companies would change (and if 
smallholders would really pay all costs, including RSPO membership fees themselves). Methodologically, our 
approach could benefit from a more longitudinal approach in which we do not only calculate real quantities, but 
also real costs and benefits during the entire life time of a plantation. This approach would then also ask for   the 
inclusion of different scenarios for discount rates as these are  inherently uncertain and depend on global and 
national developments in economy (for example inflation) and politics. Moreover, stricter selection on sampling 
bias may be applied for example by considering information and knowledge flows about certification, ownership 
of mixed plantations  (scheme and independent smallholders’ plantation) to gain better insight in spillover 
effects.  In addition, it might also be important to monetize non-market costs such as opportunity costs of 
smallholders to actively involve in organization, and non-market benefits of certification such as environmental 
improvements, and better health and to internalize them in the calculation of economic cost-benefit analysis. By 
doing so, we approach the potential benefits of certification on a national/public scale instead of solely on an 
individual scale.    
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